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Abstract 
 
 
The introduction of market mechanisms matters for industrial relations. In the German 
hospital sector, national liberalization policies have put immense pressure on local 
management and worker representatives and led to the growth of a low-wage sector.  In 
case studies of eight hospitals, we find some locales where market making has led to 
union revitalization and mobilization, but this effect varies.  Using an eight-way 
comparison, we infer a configuration of three aspects of the local political economy – 
labour markets, politics, and codetermination rules – that together provide a well fitting 
explanation for both variation and change.   
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In the 1980s and 1990s, industrial relations writers asked why German labour-
management partnership was resilient in the face of changing world markets.  The answer 
was that institutions mattered: nationally specific rules regulating in-firm worker 
participation (codetermination) and wages (coordinated collective bargaining) produced 
mutual gains for workers and employers on a mass scale (Turner 1991).  In recent years, 
however, Germany has gone from being one of the most equal societies in Europe to 
having an incidence of low-wage work close to that of the UK (Bosch and Weinkopf 
2008).  Much of this low-wage work is nominally organized, with 34% of workers in the 
lowest income quintile covered by collective agreements in 2008 (Bispinck et al 2010).  
If, as theorists argue, formal institutional change has been gradual and has served to shore 
up the system‟s basic logic (Streeck and Thelen 2005), why have these outcomes 
changed?   
 In this paper we explore these shifts in the German hospital sector.  More than 
other countries, Germany has increased the scope for hiving off groups of hospital staff 
into low-wage collective agreements for support services (Grimshaw et al 2007), to 
defect from collective bargaining altogether (Böhlke and Schulten 2009), or shift from 
one set of co-determination rules to another.  This institutional disorganization has taken 
place against the backdrop of an overall squeeze on resources in the public sector and a 
shift toward private ownership in hospitals, both resulting from the introduction of 
market mechanisms into health care funding formulae.  Unions and civil society have 
responded by mobilizing against privatization and the derecognition of sectoral 
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bargaining (Greer 2008) and by organizing within the private-sector co-determination 
framework, which is formally stronger than its public-sector counterpart. 
 We argue that, in order to understand the changes of the past decade in 
Germany, theory needs to depart from the standard toolkit of comparative institutionalism 
and turn to issues of market making and local political economy.  In response to the 
relentless liberalization of the sector, we observe a wide variation in the functioning of 
worker representation.
i
  Using an eight-way comparison, we find that variation is due to 
differences in local politics and labour markets, as well as sector-specific codetermination 
rules. 
 Our research into the sector draws on publicly available data on the sector and in-
depth interview-based qualitative research on eight hospitals, carried out between 2003 
and 2009.  Our research began in 2003 as an exploration of a campaign in Hamburg by 
Germany‟s main union in health care, vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft (ver.di) 
against a large-scale privatization initiative.  We also conducted interviews at the national 
level and at two other municipal hospitals, Chemnitz (in the east) and Stuttgart (in the 
south), to assess the representativeness of the Hamburg case.  In 2006-8 we added to our 
sample municipal hospitals operating under centre-left local governments in Dortmund 
and Berlin and the largest acquisitions of the two other large for-profit players: Helios 
(Erfurt‟s municipal hospital) and Rhön (the Gießen-Marburg university hospital).  At 
each site we interviewed works councilors and staff of the main union, ver.di, and at most 
sites we also interviewed managers, politicians, and union allies.  We triangulated this 
information using the trade press, collective agreements, consultants‟ reports, union 
newsletters, newspapers, publicly available statistical data, and interviews with national 
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officials of ver.di and the physicians union, the Marburger Bund.  We conducted 60 
interviews with 57 individuals, with more interviews at the hospitals we had been 
studying the longest, including 6 national-level experts. In January 2009 we held a 2-day 
conference in which worker representatives discussed their work and debated our 
findings. Participants included representatives from ver.di‟s national and regional offices 
and works councilors from Hamburg (Asklepios), Stuttgart (public), Gießen-Marburg 
(Rhön), and Berlin-Buch (Rhön) (see table 1). 
(Table 1 about here) 
This paper begins by reviewing recent developments in institutional theory and 
German industrial relations. Second, we provide an overview of changes in the terms of 
competition in the hospital sector and their effects in the workplace and on collective 
bargaining. Third, we examine workplace restructuring and worker representation in the 
eight case studies.  Fourth, we re-examine the case studies in terms of the local labour-
market, political, and institutional factors that mediate the relationship between 
liberalization and labour-management relations. We conclude with a discussion of the 
theoretical and policy implications.  
   
Market making and institutional theories of industrial relations  
The story of German hospitals is theoretically unlikely, because it is about employers 
covered by collective bargaining, subject to other forms of non-market regulation, not 
subject to global competition, who nevertheless compete on the basis of labour costs.  
Despite widespread acknowledgement of decline in union membership and collective 
bargaining coverage (Hassel 1999), German industrial relations is still used as a defining 
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instance of rule-based obligatory institutionalized behaviour.  Streeck and Thelen (2005), 
for example, argue that in Germany, „. . . an employer who turns his shop into a “union-
free environment” will not just be reproached by the unions he has locked out, but also by 
the courts that will remind him of the obligations the law of the land imposes on an 
employer of labor as a matter of legal duty‟ (15).  A second surprise is the union 
response, which includes localized mobilizations that resemble what US scholars call 
„social movement unionism‟.  Theory predicts that German unions have incentives to use 
social partnership to pursue their goals due to their institutionalized leverage (Baccaro et 
al 2003; Frege and Kelly 2004).  In order to understand the gap between theory and 
reality, it is worth examining the two main mechanisms in this literature that cause 
capitalist diversity and inform standard narratives of German industrial relations: 
institutional complementarities and societal embedding. 
 Most institutional theories contain a notion of systems with elements that co-
evolve in a coherent and functional way.  For Hall and Soskice (2001), for example, 
complementarities between institutional systems governing such activities as training, 
corporate governance, and wage setting create stability and difference in national 
institutions.  The coherence of these interacting systems produces comparative 
advantages for employers, which employers have an interest in preserving.  The result 
should be „dual convergence‟: coordinated market economies such as Germany will 
become more coordinated and liberal market economies such as the US will become 
more liberal.   
Events in Germany since the late 1990s have not confirmed this prediction, 
spurring a theoretical concern in institutional change.  The institutions of corporate 
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governance were subject to major revision (Höpner 2007), and collective bargaining 
experienced a functional shift away from redistribution and towards retaining jobs and 
investment (Rehder 2003).  Drawing on the Polanyian thesis of societal embedding – that 
societies tend to devise measures to counter the perceived destructive effects of the 
market – this group of writers argues that change has happened, but that social 
institutions have made it „path dependent‟ (Streeck and Thelen 2005).  Liberalization 
entails neither wholesale convergence on a neoliberal model nor retention of the old 
system, but rather, „strategic behavior on the boundaries of institutions [leading] to 
incremental forms of institutional change‟ (Sako and Jackson 2006: 563).   
For some of these writers, and for us, a defining feature of liberalization is the 
making of markets.  But what do we mean by the market, and how can one be made?  We 
speak of the market in a sociological sense (e.g. Krippner 2005), as a set of exchanges 
where more or less commodified „things‟ are bought and sold.  Every market is structured 
by government regulation, self-regulation, and participants‟ norms, and is as a result 
more or less governed by prices as opposed to non-economic concerns.  Of interest to us 
is the kind of market that emerges as a deliberate choice by the state: a choice to use the 
price mechanism more and to ignore certain other non-economic concerns.  In German 
hospitals, where there is little tradition of free competition, and where restructuring is 
politically sensitive, the state has retained its strong roles in planning and pricing and 
used these roles as levers to promote marketisation.    
While the social effects of marketisation have been peripheral to the sociology of 
markets (Beckert 2007: 17-18), they have shown up in much empirical industrial 
relations literature. For example, market mechanisms are important in the „new public 
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management‟ internationally (Kirkpatrick and Martínez Lucio 1996) and in Germany are 
increasingly used by large firms to allocate resources internally (Brinkmann and Dörre 
2008).  Market making is associated with Reaganite or Thatcherite politics; but it is also 
central to the EU‟s methods for securing the free movement of goods, services, capital 
and labour (Lillie 2010).  The creation of markets matters centrally in explaining how 
outsourcing and other forms of vertical disintegration affects industrial relations in 
Germany (Doellgast and Greer 2007). 
 As in most countries, German unions are active in 'embedding' markets, i.e.  
preventing them from eroding the terms and conditions of employment.  Conversely, the 
complexity and uncertainty caused by marketisation forms the background of most of the 
contemporary literature on unions.  They face crisis, existing patterns of action seem 
untenable, and new leaders with different outlooks implement, with more or less success, 
new strategies (Nissen 2002).  This adaptation can take the form of the re-establishment 
of bargaining at the new scale of the market, as in Commons‟ (1909) narration of the rise 
of a national market for shoes and a national union for shoemakers or Lillie‟s (2006) case 
of global collective bargaining for seafarers as a response to Flags of Convenience.  
Unions can also adapt by changing the way they intervene in the complex mechanisms of 
state, local and national government, in legislation, administrative decision-making, or 
the judiciary (Benz 2005; Katz et al 2003).  While traditions of national industrial 
relations still sometimes matter for how unions respond to liberalization (Doellgast 2009; 
Holst 2008), this has not prevented local experimentation by German trade unions (Dörre 
and Röttger 2006; Turner and Cornfield 2007; Turner 2009).  These responses have been 
shaped by the character of local civil society (Locke 1992), conflicts or communities of 
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interest (Tattersall 2005), or ideology and power relations within firms and sectors 
(Anner 2003).   
The dynamics of liberalization can be seen in Europe, where courts and 
administrative bodies have promoted more open international competition in markets for 
services.  One result in Germany has been the selloff of public service organizations in 
sectors such as energy, telecommunication, postal services, and public transport.  In the 
absence of sectoral collective agreements to regulate new competitors, to paraphrase John 
Commons, the wage bargain between workers and employer is increasingly determined 
by the price bargain between producer and customer, leading to downward pressures on 
wages (1909).   
Unlike Commons‟ shoe industry (and unlike contemporary sectors subject to 
global market pressures), the salient changes in German health care not a geographic 
extension of the market, but rather a functional extension of market mechanisms into new 
areas of activity.  In both instances, intensified competition is the result.  But here, 
marketization is a policy of managers and politicians to govern differently, rather than a 
loss of control by sovereign rule makers due to the actions of distant competitors (Lillie 
2010; MacKenzie and Martínez Lucio 2005).  Although marketization poses a threat to 
workers and unions, there is no obvious scale at which unions could re-establish control 
analogous to the national shoemakers union or the global collective agreement for 
seafarers.  Local union responses to intensified competition vary, and this paper examines 
how and why.   
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The local effects of national market making: our findings and argument 
The finding of change and diversity may in itself seem surprising, given German unions‟ 
and employers‟ reputation for hierarchical national coordination.  Why is there so much 
variation and change?  The answer can be found in the features of local context that 
support or undermine different patterns of labour-management interaction.   
We examine local industrial relations in terms of the character of worker 
representation. While all works councils in the sample were led by ver.di members, and 
could therefore be considered trade unionists, they behaved in diverse ways.  Some were 
working in close consultation with management, with a minimum of conflict, accepting 
responsibility for the effects of change, but receiving additional rights and resources; in 
keeping with other writers, we call this „co-management‟ (Rehder 2006). Others had 
good management access, which they augmented with worker mobilization. This can be 
called Konfliktpartnerschaft, and is a well established pattern in German industrial 
relations, in both the east and west (Müller-Jentsch 1999). Third, we met trade unionists 
who were excluded from decision making and had to pressure management and 
politicians from the outside, through coalition building, member mobilization, and an 
appeal to broader social issues; this can be labelled social-movement unionism (Greer 
2008).  Finally, we met trade unionists, mainly in the East, who had a resigned attitude 
towards exercising power or seeking influence and exercised their codetermination rights 
primarily in order to gather information and provide better advice to workers.  This 
approach we label quiescence (table 2). 
 
(Table 2 about here) 
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Our explanation (table 3) focuses on three aspects of the local political economy, 
which on their own are insufficient in explaining this variation, but in combination supply 
a well fitting explanation for the observed variation and change.  First, codetermination 
rules, which vary according to whether the hospitals are governed by non-profit, for-
profit, or public sector law, shape worker representatives‟ access to management.  
However, they do not assure union power, because they are subject to change in line with 
the decisions of state and local politicians, and trade unionists are not always able or 
willing to mobilize workers in support of demands.  Second, the level of local 
unemployment affects unions‟ abilities to mobilise workers.  Four of the hospitals we 
studied are in the places where unemployment is very high and four are in places where it 
is relatively low, and mobilization is more common in the latter group than in the former 
group.  Third, channels of influence in local government may provide access to decision 
making despite weak codetermination rights or mobilization capacity.  Some cities in our 
sample are governed by a strongly entrenched union-supported centre-left establishment, 
while others are governed by conservatives who tend to freeze trade unionists out of 
decision making.  These channels, however, do not ensure that social partnership will 
work smoothly; weak codetermination rights and a shift in the governing coalition can 
both undermine social partnership.   
 
(Table 3 about here) 
 
 
11 
 
Liberalization and working conditions in German hospitals 
Germany is an especially far-reaching case of hospital liberalization.  No other European 
country has privatized a larger percentage of hospitals (Böhlke and Schulten 2008) or 
seen such fragmentation in hospital collective bargaining (Grimshaw et al 2007).  
Sickness and health are not commodities that can be bought and sold, and health care is 
an existential good that Germany, like every society, provides in some form 
independently from the patient‟s ability to pay (Deppe 2002).  While there is a strong 
element of patient choice, the real powers in this so-called „dual system‟ are the two 
funders: the Länder, who are also responsible for planning and investment, and the 
(mostly quasi-public) health insurers, who cover hospitals‟ operational costs through 
reimbursements.  This organizational landscape is structured by the Social Security Code 
(Sozialgesetzbuch V) and the Hospital Financing Law (Krankenhausfinanzierungsgesetz).   
In the beginning of the 1990s, lawmakers began to introduce market mechanisms 
into the statutory framework, in order to encourage the „economization‟ of hospitals.  
Their aim was to cap costs in the face of new medical technology and rising life 
expectancy.  Because the health system depends on employer contributions to insurance 
funds, the fear was that excessive growth in healthcare costs would have undermined the 
international competitiveness of the German industry. Thus, although markets in the 
hospital industry – for patients, reimbursements, and investment capital – remained 
domestic, reformers justified their actions as a necessary adaptation to globalization. 
One crucial area of reform was hospital financing, or more specifically, the de-
coupling of payments to hospitals from the cost of provision (Simon 2007a). In the 1993 
Health Care Structure Act, lawmakers abolished the principle of full-cost recovery, 
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introduced a cap on increases in reimbursements to any given hospital (regardless of the 
service provided), and created new mechanisms for hospitals to operate under budget 
surpluses or deficits. In 1996, lawmakers added a component of reimbursement to take 
the specific diagnosis into account, and in 2000, they took this principle further.  Using 
the argument that per-diem payments created incentives for hospitals to unnecessarily 
extend patient stays, lawmakers adopted a version of an Australian system of 
standardized payments called Diagnostic Related Groups (DRGs).  
Although the DRG system was not completely implemented until 2009, its effects 
on the management of hospitals were clear from the beginning (Brandt and Schulten 
2008a; Wendl 2008). By standardizing payments according to the average „production 
costs‟ of each diagnosis, the system made it difficult for hospitals to hide their costs from 
the insurers and easier for insurers to extract cost reductions for lucrative diagnoses that 
had previously subsidized other parts of hospital operations.  This put pressures on 
hospitals to reduce costs by increasing patient-to-staff ratios, while competing for patients 
with relatively lucrative diagnoses. Under the threat of bankruptcy, hospitals operating 
under deficits faced increasing pressure to restructure; meanwhile, their competitors with 
surpluses began to save up investment capital and expand. For local governments with 
scarce resources running loss-making hospitals, privatization thus became an attractive 
solution.  
The other side of the dual financing system – investment – reinforced these 
pressures, especially the trend toward privatization.  Between 1991 and 2008, the share of 
GDP invested in the public sector dropped from 2.6% to 1.5 %, putting Germany in 
second to last place among EU member states (Anonymous 2009). The hospital trade 
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association estimates the resulting backlog of investment at around €50 billion (Blum and 
Offermanns 2009); some economists estimate it at €100 billion (Simon 2008). Given the 
government‟s reluctance to increase taxes, the financial tug-of-war between state and 
national government built into the federal system, and the overall limits on government 
borrowing set by the „European Stability and Growth Pact‟, Länder turned to 
privatization as an alternative source of investment capital. 
Until the 1990s most German hospitals were operated either by local government 
or not-for-profit organizations (mainly churches), while for-profit hospitals played only a 
minor role, with smaller, specialized clinics. The first wave of privatization began in 
1991 in the eastern Länder, where planners created a mixed economy of hospitals with 
less government ownership than in the west.  After 2000, a second wave of restructuring 
occurred, this time in the west, which included the privatization of some of the largest 
municipal hospital systems. The share of hospitals in private ownership increased from 
15% in 1991 to 33% in 2010 (figure 1). At first, the targets of privatization were smaller 
hospitals with under 100 beds, but as the private hospital chains expanded, so did the 
average size of private hospitals. From 2002 to 2010 the share of beds in these hospitals 
increased from 9% to 17% (Anonymous, various years), and in 2005, of the more than 
65,000 beds controlled by private companies, more than half were controlled by three 
companies, Asklepios, Rhön, and Fresenius (the parent company of Helios), each with 
just over 10,000 (Brandt and Schulten 2008a).  Meanwhile, hospitals that remained state-
owned were merged into independent subsidiaries with a private legal form, granting 
hospital administrators more autonomy and reducing the day-to-day involvement of state 
and local government.  The share of beds at public hospitals with a private legal form 
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increased from 27% to 57% from 2002 to 2009, while the figure at closely held public 
hospitals declined from 54% to 16% (Anonymous, various years) (figure 1).   
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
 
Since more than 64% of hospital expenses are spent on personnel (ibid.), cost 
pressures have had several implications for industrial relations.  One result has been work 
intensification.  Between 1995 and 2005 the number of hospital employees dropped by 
85,000 full-time equivalents (FTEs).  Doctors were the only group that saw an increase, 
of about 19,000 FTEs, while all other groups, including nurses and assistants, 
experienced cuts (Simon 2007b). One method of reducing staff has been the outsourcing 
of support services such as cleaning, cooking, driving, and information technology 
systems.   As the number of employees has declined, the number of „cases‟ has increased 
(Figure 2), leading to higher patient-to-staff ratios (Marrs 2007).  At privately owned 
hospitals this trend has gone especially far: while an average full-time nurse in the private 
sector was responsible for 505 occupied bed-days in 2007, the corresponding public-
sector figure was 421. A private-sector doctor, on average, treated 23% more patients 
than a public-sector doctor, and the difference is even greater for physiotherapists, 
psychologists, pharmacists, and social workers (Böhlke and Schulten 2009).   
 
(Figure 2 about here) 
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Cost pressures have also led to the fragmentation of collective bargaining.  Before 
liberalization, all public hospitals were covered by the public sector collective agreement, 
known as the Bundesangestelltentarifvertrag (BAT) and in 2005 reformed as the 
Tarifvertrag des öffentlichen Dienstes (TVöD), and most not-for-profit hospitals oriented 
their working conditions to those in the public sector.  As for-profit chains have bought 
hospitals, they have shifted their staff into company- or hospital-level agreements or 
unilaterally implemented pay freezes.  Consequently, in 2007, labour costs per employee 
at for-profit hospitals were 4% lower than in the public sector, with greater savings for 
nurses (9%) (Böhlke and Schulten 2009: 111).  One survey found that 24% of employees 
in private hospitals had no collective bargaining at all, and the wages of only about a 
third were oriented to TVöD (Anonymous 2007). Other private hospitals have used a 
collective agreement with lower rates of pay signed by an association of private hospitals 
and a small union unaffiliated with the mainstream trade union movement (Gröschl-Bahr 
and Stumpfögger 2008).
ii
   
Intensified price-based competition has had implications for collective bargaining 
in public sector hospitals.  One common cost-cutting measure in the public sector has 
been to shift staff in support services into subsidiaries with low-wage collective 
agreements for cooking, cleaning, security, or transportation (Jaehrling 2008).  Another 
option is the use of hospital-level hardship agreements („Notlagentarifverträge‟), under 
which pay can be reduced by up to 6% in exchange for employment security.  A third 
option is derecognition of collective agreements; this is rare at publicly owned hospitals, 
but has taken place (as in Chemnitz, described below).  In cases of privatization or 
outsourcing, German law protects the pay and working conditions of staff for one year; 
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wages and working conditions afterwards depend on collective or individual negotiations 
between staff and employer. 
The story, however, is not merely one of disorganization and decline: ver.di 
membership has increased or been stable in the hospitals we have studied.  The 
physicians union Marburger Bund grew from 70,000 to 110,000 members after a 2005 
strike, giving it a membership density of 70%.  Because of the implications for pay, work 
tempo, and service quality, hospital restructuring often leads to conflict at local level; 
every case of hospital privatization we know of has faced serious opposition.  This local 
movement may be influencing national events: while ver.di had little success in 
influencing the design of markets in the 2002 reforms, in 2008 it worked in a broad 
health-care industry coalition to mobilize 130,000 workers and win a €3.5b increase in 
hospital funding for 2009.  Liberalization thus presents an opportunity for union 
revitalization, nationally and locally.   
 
 
Local trade union responses 
Compared to IG Metall, the union most commonly studied in the English-language 
literature on Germany, ver.di is an extremely diverse organization.  It was formed in a 
2001 merger of five service-sector unions, two of which were present in hospitals (the 
white-collar DAG and the public-sector ÖTV), making it Germany‟s largest service-
sector union. Ver.di‟s structure – a „matrix‟ intended to preserve sectoral identities, while 
integrating administrative functions – has two cross-cutting dimensions of relevance here: 
(1) a sectoral dimension of 13 broad Fachbereiche, including FB3: Churches, Social 
Services, Welfare and Health Care, and a much larger number of narrower Fachgruppen, 
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including one within FB3 for hospitals; (2) a geographic dimension of 11 state-level 
Landesbezirke, plus local Bezirke and Ortsvereine. [Adding to this complexity are two 
additional dimensions: Personengruppen (e.g. gays, youth, unemployed), which are 
nominally represented at every geographic level, and Ressorts (e.g. social and health care 
policy), and departments covering specific issues across the whole organization].  The 
advantage of this fragmented structure is its relative openness to innovation within a 
locality or a sector (Greer, 2008); its disadvantage is the difficulty of between-sector 
coordination in national campaigns (Doellgast and Holtgrewe, 2011). 
Local trade unionists have not been completely on their own.  In some local 
cases, such as Hamburg and Stuttgart, battles around hospital restructuring were 
important early moments defining the local Bezirk’s identity and strategy; in these cases 
material support came from the national union. Hospitals have become increasingly 
important in national public-sector strikes, as the large blue-collar-dominated enterprises 
that were the old ÖTV‟s main source of leverage have been privatized or taken out of the 
national public-sector bargaining framework. Likewise, establishing collective bargaining 
and codetermination at for-profit chains has become an important task for the national 
staff of FB3, as has the hospital financing campaign. Compared to most of the public 
sector, ver.di has been successful at the hospitals we have visited in avoiding 
derecognition of collective bargaining.  Only in Chemnitz has the employer lowered the 
wages of core workers substantially below the rate the TVöD, although all hospitals have 
implemented lower-paying collective agreements for some outsourced support services.  
We now turn to the four patterns of worker representation.   
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Co-management  
In Dortmund, Berlin-Vivantes, and pre-2001 Hamburg, restructuring was negotiated with 
a minimum of conflict.  Some of these workplaces had a history of mobilization, as in 
Hamburg, where local trade unionists had occupied a hospital slated for closure in the 
mid-1990s, or a strong mobilization potential, as in Dortmund, where union density 
approached 40% (in Berlin-Vivantes and pre-2001 Hamburg, density ranged between 10 
and 15%).  
All of these workplaces went through restructuring starting in the mid to late 
1990s. In 1995, for example, Hamburg turned its hospitals into a separate state-owned 
enterprise, Landesbetrieb Krankenhäuser (LBK) Hamburg, closed a historic hospital, and 
set about eliminating 3000 out of 15,000 jobs. Berlin‟s state owned hospitals were 
merged as Vivantes in 2001 and given a private legal form; afterwards, management 
eliminated nearly 2000 out of 12,000 jobs and outsourced most support services. When 
Dortmund‟s hospitals received a non-profit legal form in 1999, management moved to 
reduce costs through changes in procurement, rather than personnel cuts.  
In each case, the union‟s influence depended on personal ties with policymakers. 
In Hamburg and Dortmund, these channels of influence ran through the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD), which had dominated municipal politics continuously for most 
of the post-WWII era in close cooperation with trade unions. Vivantes was created by a 
„grand coalition‟ (SPD and conservatives) in Berlin‟s local government; here, the union 
also worked constructively with conservative politicians. Key managers were part of 
these networks. In Dortmund and Berlin, the worker-nominated Arbeitsdirektor was built 
into the hospitals‟ enabling legislation. In Hamburg, the arrangements were less formal: 
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like many of his trade-union counterparts, the director of the hospitals was an active SPD 
member. Furthermore, these cities‟ unions were represented directly on the city councils 
by staff and activists.  
Worker participation in restructuring these hospitals extended well beyond the 
minima stipulated by law, which in Hamburg and Dortmund were relatively weak. 
Hamburg, Dortmund and Berlin all went through a change of legal form under co-
management, with the aim of cutting costs and reducing staff numbers. The negotiations 
over this process went far beyond bargaining over the effects on staff. In Hamburg and 
Dortmund, workers won rights in addition to the legal minima under their legal forms.  In 
Hamburg, management agreed with the union on a committee structure for negotiating 
the restructuring of departments, complete with an independent consultant to support 
worker representatives, to augment the relatively weak public-sector codetermination 
framework.  In Dortmund, the enabling legislation for the restructuring stipulated 
codetermination practices reflecting those under the private-sector framework, despite the 
non-profit legal form, and a 2005 collective agreement extended these practices.  In all 
three cases, strong political influence led to a strengthening of codetermination practices 
in the newly restructured workplaces, reinforcing the pattern of co-management.  
These worker representatives thus enjoyed long-lasting close relationships with 
management and local politicians. However, co-management was not to last in Hamburg 
and seems to be coming to an end in Dortmund. In Hamburg, the immediate cause of 
change was a switch in local government to one willing to ignore trade unionists. The 
more general cause, however, was the squeeze on resources associated with the 
liberalization process: Hamburg had massive pension liabilities, and Dortmund operates 
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at a loss and faces delays in receiving investment from the state government. In 
Hamburg, local politicians were not interested in union offers for a compromise, making 
social partnership impossible. In Dortmund, the local political establishment came under 
pressure due to funding delays and the categorical refusal of wage concessions for 
physicians by the Marburger Bund.  Autumn 2008 seemed to signal the end of business 
as usual in Dortmund: ver.di activists and the DGB set up a local coalition dubbed 
„ProKlinikumDo‟ which used media work and public demonstrations to defend the 
hospitals. 
 
 
Social movement unionism 
 In Stuttgart and post-2001 Hamburg, change has been negotiated against a backdrop of 
worker and community mobilization. While in Hamburg this strategy represented a 
change for the union, in Stuttgart it reflected a history of exclusion from politics. The link 
with civil society required unions to engage with issues beyond the defence of jobs and 
collective bargaining, such as public service quality, democracy, and the untranslatable 
German value of Menschenwürde.  
The majority buyout of LBK-Hamburg by Asklepios Kliniken was the largest 
hospital privatization in German history. After the Conservatives won the elections in 
2001, they immediately pushed for privatization. In this situation the newly established 
union, ver.di, initiated a referendum, together with a wide range of allies from civil 
society. Although the referendum was successful and spilled over into a second campaign 
to make ballot initiatives legally binding, a majority stake was sold to Asklepios. After an 
18-month dispute, which included a series of demonstrations and work stoppages, an 
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agreement was signed in 2007 that linked wages and working conditions to the national 
public-sector framework. 
In Stuttgart, by contrast, worker representatives had no history as co-managers. 
They did have a long history of battling the conservative-dominated local government 
over hospital restructuring. Nor did they have privatization to contend with: Stuttgarter 
Kliniken was created by a merger in 1999 and is a closely held municipal agency. Shortly 
after the formation of ver.di in 2001, the union and works council ran a campaign against 
the concentration of cooking in a single location. Called „no to the cooking factory‟, this 
campaign was coordinated closely with the Catholic industrial chaplaincy, and 
highlighted the difficult working conditions of the low-paid, mostly female, staff. Two 
years later, the city announced its intention to close three hospitals and concentrate 
activity on one large campus, in hopes of finding efficiencies and reducing staff numbers. 
After demonstrations involving a wide range of local activists, the city agreed to consider 
ver.di‟s alternative concept. In 2005, the union followed up with a successful protest 
against introducing a private legal form, fearing that such a move would make the 
hospital susceptible to bankruptcy and privatization. That same year, workers struck for 
14 weeks to prevent the city from leaving the employer‟s association, and as the largest 
part of the city government, the hospitals played a key role.  
While worker participation was relatively weak at these hospitals, ver.di seemed 
to be in the process of establishing its influence. In Stuttgart, pressure is building on the 
hospital management to reduce debt, and worker representatives have been in a series of 
negotiations to minimize the pain to workers. Meanwhile, at Asklepios, ver.di is involved 
in setting up national codetermination, not only for Hamburg, but for other locations. In 
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both cases, campaigning has also led to an increase in union membership, in Hamburg, 
more than doubling since privatization to more than 30%. 
In Stuttgart and Hamburg, a social-movement approach developed over a long 
period. Both places were the sites of strikes in response to employer challenges to the 
framework of public-sector collective bargaining, and union membership grew as a 
result. If ver.di persists, new insider channels of influence may be created. If so, it will be 
different from co-management, because it will be more tentative on the union side, and 
shaped by 7-10 years of conflict.  
 
Konfliktpartnerschaft 
 At the two university clinics, Berlin-Charité and Gießen-Marburg, we observed a pattern 
of participation backed up with mobilization, with neither having the intensity seen in co-
management or social-movement unionism. At first sight, these seem to be cases of 
social-movement unionism. However, these mobilizations are much closer to traditional 
German industrial relations, because coalition work is not central to the mobilizations, 
and because conflict is used to exploit, strengthen, or expand existing channels of 
influence. Union density here is around 10-20% and tends to increase in times of conflict. 
Universitätsklinikum Gießen und Marburg was the first privatized university 
hospital in Europe; it was created through a merger of two university clinics and sold to 
the Rhön Kliniken AG in 2006. The merger was a necessary step to find an investor who 
was willing to buy the heavily indebted clinic in Gießen. While trade unionists resisted 
privatization, especially in Marburg, they accepted an invitation by the conservative 
government to participate in a planning group. After the clinics were privatized, ver.di 
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took industrial action to achieve a collective bargaining agreement. This mobilization 
built on a strong local tradition of trade unionism that had developed in a context of good 
political connections and weak codetermination rights.  Under the post-1999 
conservative-led and pre-1999 SPD-led governments alike, the union faced pragmatic 
politicians willing to listen, but very weak workplace-level co-determination rights. 
Like Vivantes, Charité is publicly owned and located in Berlin, but since it is a 
university clinic, codetermination rights are significantly weaker. It is the product of a 
merger in 2003, under a new left-wing coalition government, which brought together the 
university clinics in West and East Berlin into a single organization. Works council 
members have relatively little access to the management and thus cannot negotiate over 
changes as effectively as their colleagues at Vivantes. In 2005 and 2006 there were 
several brief „warning strikes‟ and rallies to use the standards of TVöD, rather than the 
less generous terms and conditions of the Land Berlin, and, without mobilizing much 
public support, worker representatives achieved most of their goals. 
At Berlin-Charité and Gießen-Marburg, worker representatives have not faced the 
exclusion from management and politics seen in Stuttgart and post-2001 Hamburg.  Nor 
is management as committed to intensive worker participation and collective bargaining 
as in Dortmund or Berlin-Vivantes. True to a traditional industry focus, workers are 
mobilized mainly around workplace issues. 
 
Quiescence 
In Erfurt and Chemnitz, two eastern cities with high unemployment rates and weak 
traditions of trade unionism, we observe quiescence within the hospitals. Here, works 
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councillors – most of whom are ver.di members – tend to play a social-work role, rather 
than mobilizing or participating in detailed consultations over the management of change, 
and neither hospital belongs to the public-sector employers association. 
Klinikum Chemnitz is owned by the city government and, since 1994, has been 
run under a non-profit legal form. Despite the presence of key trade unionists in the three 
largest party groups on the city council and a long-serving SPD mayor, trade unionists 
have had little influence in the management of the hospital. According to worker 
representatives, employees are satisfied with having a job and unwilling to take action for 
better working conditions or higher wages.  Furthermore, the mayor and administration 
are highly effective in cutting costs and winning support for their restructuring plans in 
city council. Hence, management has been able to outsource support services without 
union resistance, and in 2005 left the employers association and unilaterally introduced 
lower pay grades for most new employees.  
At first sight Erfurt seems very different: not only is the Klinikum Erfurt in the 
private sector, but it became Germany‟s first large case of privatization when it was 
bought by Helios in 1996. Although worker representatives formed an alliance with 
groups in civil society to oppose privatization, the coalition collapsed when it failed to 
prevent the sale. Helios began cutting costs by changing its procurement practices, and 
later moved on to reducing staff. Since there were no mandatory redundancies, works 
council members found little basis to organize resistance. In January 2007 Helios signed 
a national company-level collective agreement, negotiated with national ver.di staff. 
Under this new framework, Erfurt‟s pay scales introduce East-West parity earlier than the 
TVöD, with little downward deviation from the national agreement. 
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Why is quiescence specific to the East?  Our interviewees pointed to 
unemployment rates between 15 and 20% and weak union influence in local government. 
Surprisingly, low union membership is not always the issue: in Chemnitz, density is 
around a quarter, higher than some of the western hospitals. It may be that, in the event of 
an economic upturn or the retirement of workers, managers, and union staff educated 
under communism, worker representatives in Erfurt and Chemnitz could become more 
assertive.  
 
Explaining diversity 
  
Why do local industrial relations vary when market mechanisms are rolled out on a 
national scale?  In local polities closed to union influence we saw either quiescence or 
social-movement unionism, depending on labour-market pressures.   In more open local 
polities, not all of which were led by centre-left parties, we were surprised by the 
variation. Ownership also mattered, because it determined the applicable statutory 
framework of co-determination.  We observed Konfliktpartnerschaft under conditions of 
weak codetermination rights, i.e. under traditional public-sector co-determination rules, 
and (with one exception) co-management under conditions of strong codetermination 
rights, i.e. under private-sector co-determination practices.  In this sense, these three 
variables are inseparable characteristics of the local context that shape industrial relations 
under liberalization. 
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Codetermination rights 
Codetermination rights matter, because they determine how much access workers have to 
management decisionmaking.  However, different statutory frameworks apply, and 
public, private and non-profit legal forms all have different mandatory subjects of 
consultation and stipulate different worker roles in governance. Public-sector 
codetermination rights are set by Länder, but additional rights are often built into 
restructured hospitals through collective agreements or enabling legislation, sometimes 
associated with a switch to a private legal form.  State and local governments thus have 
much flexibility in setting codetermination rules. 
Public-sector codetermination is limited to immediate workplace issues by the 
legal theory that elected parliamentarians, rather than the public-sector workforce, should 
be responsible for public service provision.  Under public legal forms Anstalt or 
Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts (AöR or KöR, used for municipal and university 
clinics, respectively), codetermination does not extend to „strategic‟ decisions around 
investment and technology and there are fewer worker representation on supervisory 
boards than in the private sector. Hospitals with the private legal form Gesellschaft mit 
beschränkter Haftung (GmbH), whether publicly or privately owned, fall under national 
private-sector codetermination rules, with more mandatory issues of consultation.  Large 
GmbHs have parity representation on the supervisory board – i.e. half of the seats, but no 
veto power – and an Arbeitsdirektor responsible for personnel issues and nominated by 
worker representatives. The non-profit variant (gGmbH) is weaker and has no 
requirement for parity or an Arbeitsdirektor.  
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The three large for-profit chains have distinct enough industrial relations 
strategies that the roles of worker representatives vary significantly between them. These 
hospitals are all covered by the stronger codetermination rules associated with the GmbH 
form (although smaller subsidiaries doing service work usually fall under the size 
threshold for parity codetermination).  During our research, ver.di was in the process of 
organizing collective bargaining and establishing codetermination organs within the 
private hospital companies.  With Helios they signed a national collective agreement in 
2007 which stipulated almost the same conditions as determined by the public-sector 
agreement. Asklepios, after initially taking a hard-line approach in the dispute in 
Hamburg (and then negotiating a local agreement that mirrored the public sector), 
accepted the principle of multi-workplace bargaining.  Negotiations, however, broke 
down when the company refused to negotiate an encompassing national company-wide 
framework.  For its part, Rhön-Kliniken remains only willing to bargain at the hospital 
level (Gröschl-Bahr and Stumpfögger 2008).  
Surprisingly, two of the hospitals in our sample with the most labour-management 
conflict are state-owned with a public legal form. Weak public-sector codetermination 
rights have led to the exclusion of worker representatives from management decision 
making. Stuttgart‟s municipal clinics (which were spun off into AöR in 1999) and at the 
Charité in Berlin (which was a merger of three university hospitals and became in 2005 a 
KöR), workers have struck to defend the link to national bargaining. In Stuttgart, this 
mobilization involved a strong element of support from local „social networks‟, as trade 
unionists called them – citizens initiatives and worker-priests – supporting campaigns 
against speedups in service areas or for more funding for hospitals. At university clinics 
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union influence is especially weak, because workers are represented as one of many 
interest groups on the governing bodies, which professors tend to dominate. 
At state-owned hospitals with a private legal form, we observe two different 
patterns of trade unionism. The first we observe at the municipal clinics of Dortmund (a 
gGmbH) and Vivantes in Berlin (a GmbH), namely a strong pattern of social partnership. 
In Dortmund, trade unionists won a stronger form of codetermination than that required 
for the non-profit gGmbH form. They accomplished this by threatening a campaign that 
would have disrupted restructuring and by negotiating an alternative with the SPD-led 
local government. Before privatization, Hamburg had a functional equivalent. Because of 
its public legal form, it lacked an Arbeitsdirektor or supervisory board, but the complex 
deal that established the new organization also introduced a wide range of consultative 
mechanisms. These mechanisms were also established after a conflict, this time the 
occupation of a hospital that was to be closed. The second option, which we observe in 
Chemnitz, which is also a wholly-owned municipal gGmbH, is that codetermination 
takes place at the absolute minimum level allowed under a non-profit legal form.   
The notion that German codetermination rules limit within-country diversity does 
not apply to hospitals, where these rules vary depending on organizational form.  
Furthermore, those hospitals subject to strong statutory codetermination frameworks do 
not all have smoothly operating labour-management partnership, and in hospitals 
operating under weaker non-profit and public-sector rules, ver.di sometimes negotiates 
improvements in participation rights.  The way that codetermination rights are used thus 
depends on other factors. 
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Local unemployment 
Unemployment rates matter for the mobilization potential of employees. As many East 
German trade unionists argue in interviews, if workers are merely happy to have jobs, 
they are unlikely to mobilize against restructuring. If they have good chances of 
employment on the outside labour market, the level of fear should be lower and 
mobilization easier. This labour market effect is consistent with the impressions of 
national ver.di officials we interviewed and confirmed by the variation in our sample. 
Our sample, like Germany, can be divided into two kinds of local economies. 
Dortmund, Erfurt, Chemnitz and Berlin – four locales hit very hard by deindustrialization 
– have had unemployment levels fluctuating between 13% and 20% from 1993 to 2008, 
with 15-year averages ranging between 16% and 18%. Marburg, Hamburg, and Stuttgart, 
by contrast, which had either stable manufacturing sectors (Stuttgart), or enough new 
service employment to compensate (Hamburg and Marburg), had unemployment levels 
of between 5% and 13% over the same period, with 15-year averages between 8% and 
11% (Anonymous 2008).  
In cities with higher unemployment, mobilization is more difficult, and most 
cases fall into the co-management or quiescence category. In the one exception, Berlin-
Charité, mobilization was not as sustained as in Hamburg or Stuttgart and the political 
structure more open than in Erfurt and Chemnitz. Although works councillors won a 
collective agreement linked to the national public-sector settlement – which is not self-
evident in Berlin, since the Land itself has left the employers association and negotiated 
pay concessions with ver.di – they did not win the strong codetermination rights seen at 
Dortmund, Vivantes, or pre-privatization Hamburg. 
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The pressure put on workers by high unemployment explains some of the east-
west divide in German trade unionism. However, eastern trade unionists are not all 
quiescent (at least not in Berlin), and western trade unionists are not all militant. Nor are 
all of the high-unemployment zones in the east; Dortmund is in the west.  Finally, labour-
market pressures do not necessarily translate into low union membership density: 
membership is high in Chemnitz (probably due to the aggressiveness of management) 
and Dortmund (reportedly due to the city‟s tradition of coal and steel).  
 
Local politics 
The receptiveness of local politics to unions matters in their decisions about mobilizing 
workers and allies against restructuring plans. This is a rarely explored field in academic 
studies of German industrial relations, partly due to the widespread perception that the 
industrial relations system is centralized and partly due to the focus on large private-
sector manufacturing firms. However, hospital privatization and restructuring is a matter 
for city- and county-level politics, and public-sector codetermination rules, hospital 
planning, and universities (and their clinics) are matters for Länder. Usually, SPD-led 
governments are more open to union influence, and conservative-led governments are 
more closed, although conservative politicians in Hessen and Berlin have chosen a more 
pragmatic approach towards trade unions and left-of-centre politicians in Chemnitz have 
been unreceptive. 
In some cities, unions have a long history of influence due to their tight 
connection to the SPD. This is most clearly the case in Dortmund, where politics are 
shaped by a history of coal and steel, high union density, and decades of uninterrupted 
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SPD electoral dominance. Hamburg is also a traditional union stronghold, with strong, 
politicized trade unionists in the manufacturing and transportation industries by the 
harbour. Prior to their respective electoral defeats in 1999 and 2001, Social Democrats 
had led Hessen‟s and Hamburg‟s governments almost continuously since the end of 
World War II. In Berlin, unions have also had good connections in politics partly due to 
the moderation of local Conservatives.  This influence improved after 2001 with the 
advent of a coalition of Social Democrats and former communists. In these places, while 
public-sector industrial conflict is not unheard-of, union embeddedness in elite networks 
makes it easier to settle disputes, and in some cases, like Hessen, union influence has 
persisted despite the coming of a conservative government. Under these conditions, trade 
unionists either take advantage of the chance to be co-managers or (in more difficult 
times) seek to reinforce their influence through the complex dance of 
Konfliktpartnerschaft. 
Other cities have little tradition of union influence. In the former GDR, for 
example, the networks of trade unionists, politicians and public administrators are quite 
thin. In Chemnitz, despite an SPD mayor and trade unionists in the three largest party 
groups on the city council, unions have very little influence in public-sector restructuring. 
In Erfurt from 1990 to 2006 the mayor was from the conservative party and never 
established working relations with trade unionists. Similarly, in parts of the West, such as 
Stuttgart, local politics are dominated by conservatives, and the left is on the outside.  In 
these places, politicians have little fear of taking on trade unions, and unions either fight 
back creatively, as in the social movement unionism seen in Stuttgart or post-2001 
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Hamburg, or counsel workers at an individual level on how to cope with the effects, as in 
Erfurt and Chemnitz. 
In the hospitals in our sample, state and local politics have shaped what trade 
unionists can accomplish. Some important decisions, such as whether to privatize, 
outsource, or leave the employers association, are left to the political and managerial 
sphere and not subject to codetermination.  In this sense, the institutional frameworks 
governing worker participation and pay setting are locally chosen. Consequently, there 
are important moments in which national institutions of codetermination or sectoral 
bargaining provide little assistance to trade unionists. Where unions have retained strong 
traditional channels of influence, as in Dortmund or Berlin-Vivantes, labour-management 
partnership has been possible, at times with an element of conflict. Elsewhere, these 
channels have broken down, as in Hamburg, or never existed, as in most of the east and 
conservative-dominated parts of the west.  In the latter places, unions built alternative 
forms of pressure or simply retreated. 
 
Implications for policy and theory 
 
In German hospitals, the effects of market making are far reaching. The state has 
attempted to raise capital investment by privatizing hospitals and slow cost increases by 
altering the reimbursement formulae used by insurers.  These policies have encouraged 
the rise of for-profit hospital chains and led to greater transparency in pricing, leading to 
intensified cost-based competition between hospitals.  As competition has intensified, 
managers have come under ever more pressure reduce costs and increase revenues.  In 
this labour-intensive industry, this means treating more „cases‟ with fewer employees, in 
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some cases on lower pay.  Although this is not exactly a zero-sum game, it is also not a 
fertile ground for mutual gains between insurers, hospitals, and workers.  In general, the 
market‟s effectiveness as a way to cap costs undermines ver.di‟s bargaining power: we 
see concessions both in cases of partnership and conflict.  Concessions have been 
especially deep in easy-to-outsource support services such as cooking and cleaning, 
which has lead to greater pay inequality.  While the causal chain between market 
construction and workplace change is complex, it is also robust: most actors refer back to 
it in explaining their actions. 
Setbacks in collective bargaining notwithstanding, we do find some evidence of 
union revitalization.  In some of the cities we visited, hospitals were the largest 
employers and sites of creative campaigns and massive membership gains.  Privatization 
did not lead to deviation from the sectoral agreement where ver.di was well organized.  
At the national level, ver.di built on this success by establishing national collective 
bargaining at one of the national hospital chains (Helios) and mobilizing members and 
allies to win a massive infusion of cash into the sector.   
In German hospitals, intensified competition is not an uncontrollable outside 
force, but rather a steering mechanism used to contain costs.  Under these conditions, the 
state and employers cannot be relied upon as agents of market correction.  The problem is 
not only a gap between national institutions and local implementation.  In our cases, the 
formal rules could not be read off of a national model, because employers and local 
policymakers were able to choose between statutory codetermination frameworks and 
between sectoral collective agreements.  More fundamentally, some of the agents that had 
once built and sustained the German model were committed to a form of marketization 
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that led to socially undesirable consequences (low-wage work) and political conflict.  In 
these struggles, worker representatives took part in shifting and fragile coalitions at 
several levels, including that of the locale.   
Although these cases are far from unique, the processes we describe vary in 
their generalizability.  Within Germany, the disorganization of collective bargaining is 
hardly unique to health care, but can affect any sector with widespread outsourcing or 
price-based competitive pressures (Doellgast and Greer 2007).  Germany may be in a 
class of its own in terms of the extent of the expansion of low-wage work since the mid-
1990s (Bosch and Weinkopf 2008; Grimshaw et al 2007); however, recent shifts to 
liberalize services across Europe may be bringing this trend to other countries (Lillie 
2010).  The locale also seems to matters in a wider range of countries for workers‟ 
capacities to resist these pressures.  While strong qualitative evidence from a wide range 
of countries shows that such local factors explain union strategy (Dörre and Röttger 
2006; Locke 1992; Tattersall 2010; Turner and Cornfield 2007) it is a matter for future 
research to examine whether they also matter, for example, in centralized states such as 
the UK.  Less generalizable is the fragmentation of co-determination rules due to 
differing ownership structures.  This mechanism is particular to those public services in 
Germany that operate as a „mixed market‟ of public, nonprofit and private sector 
providers.  Furthermore, within the German health care sector, these are large, well 
organized workplaces; ver.di therefore has better-than-average leverage in the 
renegotiation of wage setting and worker participation arrangements. 
Market making, and resistance to it, deserve a more central place in policy-
relevant social science.  In many areas where markets do not exist, public policy is 
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creating them, which may be leading to a shift of costs and risks from the rich and 
powerful to the poor and powerless.  As we have documented above, this process has led 
to union revitalization in some large private service-sector workplaces.  A general theory 
of how different kinds of markets affect workers and workplaces would be relevant 
beyond the field of industrial relations and could underpin alternative proposals for 
institutional design.  
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Table 1. Sample and sources  
Name Employees 
in 2007 
Owner How and when formed Data gathered 
Vivantes Netzwerk 
für Gesundheit 
GmbH 
13,500 Land Berlin Municipal clinics merged into an 
autonomous subsidiary in 2001 
11 interviews 
Charité 
Universitätsmedizin  
Berlin 
12,800 Land Berlin 
 
University clinics merged into a 
closely held agency in 2003 
3 interviews 
Asklepios Kliniken 
Hamburg GmbH 
8900 (FTEs) Asklepios 
Kliniken 
GmbH 
(74.9%) 
Municipal clinics merged in 1995 
and privatized in 2005 
20 interviews; 
participant 
observation; 
workshop 
presentation 
Klinikum Stuttgart
  
6400 City of 
Stuttgart 
Municipal clinics merged into a 
closely held agency in 1999 
6 interviews; 
workshop 
presentation 
Klinikum Dortmund 
gGmbH 
4200 City of 
Dortmund 
Municipal clinics merged into an 
autonomous subsidiary in 1999 
4 interviews 
Universitätsklinikum 
Gießen und Marburg 
GmbH  
4000 Rhön AG 
(95%) 
University clinics merged in 2005 
and privatized in 2006 
10 interviews; 
workshop 
presentation 
Klinikum Chemnitz 
gGmbH 
3710 City of 
Chemnitz 
Municipal clinics merged into 
autonomous subsidiary in 1994 
6 interviews 
Helios Klinikum 
Erfurt GmbH 
2000 Helios AG Municipal clinics privatized in 
1997 
2 interviews 
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Table 2. Types of worker representation 
Degree of... Konflikt-
partnerschaft 
Social-
movement 
unionism 
Co-
management 
Quiescence 
access to 
management 
High Low 
 
High Low 
worker 
mobilization 
High High Low Low 
coalitions with 
civil society 
Medium High Low Low 
engagement 
with justice 
issues beyond 
the workplace 
Medium High Low Low 
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Table 3. Comparison of cases 
  local politics 
co-determi-
nation rights 
Unem-
ployment 
Open to union influence Closed 
Strong Low Konfliktpartnerschaft: 
Gießen-Marburg post-2006* 
(private) 
 
Co-management: 
Hamburg pre-2001 
(public) 
Social-movement unionism: 
Hamburg post-2001 
(private) 
high  Co-management: 
Dortmund 
(public) 
Berlin-Vivantes 
(public) 
 
Quiescence: 
Erfurt 
(private) 
Weak Low Konfliktpartnerschaft: 
Gießen-Marburg pre-2006 * 
(public) 
Social-movement unionism: 
Stuttgart 
(public) 
 
high  Konfliktpartnerschaft: 
Berlin-Charité 
(public) 
Quiescence: 
Chemnitz 
(public) 
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i
  „Worker representation‟ in this paper refers to three kinds of actors. Gewerkschaft, or trade union, 
operating above the level of the firm; Betriebsrat, a formally separate works council body at the level of the 
workplace and firm under private and voluntary sector labor law; and Personalrat, a works council in a 
private-law company under public sector rules. In all of our cases, most works councillors are union 
members and work with union full-time officials. 
ii
 The union is called the German Staff Association for Trade and Industry [Deutschen Handels- und 
Industrieangestellten Verband], an affiliate of the small Christian Trade Union Confederation [Christlichen 
Gewerkschaftsbund]. 
